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All of the series show less dramatic changes in
housing prices when adjusted for changes in the
general price level. Nonetheless, "real" housing
prices, by any measure, have increased by 50
percent or so in the past 15 years. Since 1984,
the u.s. Department of Commerce series dis-
plays no significant changes in this measure of
housing prices, however, while the NAHB and







general appear to be rising, since larger homes
tend to be more expensive. The U.s. Department
of Commerce produces a housing price data se-
ries using data on new housing that permits
adjustment for many of the qualitative features of
the homes sold. This series displays a less dra-
maticprice trend, particularly in recent years,
but suffers from the problem that the behavior of
the prices of new housing may not reflect the
changes in the value of existing homes in estab-
lished areas.
Housing fundamentals
The precise pattern of price increases aside, there
is a strong perception that housing prices have
risen to unrealistic levels, particularly in certain
regions. Although this may be the case, econo-
Housing prices in the United States have risen
dramatically in the last few decades. After adjust-
ingfor changes in quality, the price of a new
home appears to have risen about 350 percent
between 1970 and 1988. In the urban areas of
California and the Northeast, the rate of increase
recently has been particularly rapid; in the first
half of 1988 alone, home prices in California may
have risen by as much as 20 percent.
The notion that housing asset values might
plummet suddenly, if true, has important implica-
tions. Housing values collateralize residential
mortgage loans, which comprise about 30 per-
cent of the assets of bank and thrift lenders.
Moreover, because of tax reforms in 1986 that re-
duced deductibility of interest on other types of
debt, housing-backed debt in the form of home
equity credit is growing rapidly. A scenario of de-
clining home prices, mortgage delinquencies,
and foreclosures would be very troublesome for
the U.S. economy and its financial institutions.
This Letter examines whether the housing market
is generating prices that are not sustainable.
Price data
While housing prices do appear to have risen,
the precise pattern of change is not easy to extract
from available data. Data from the National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), for ex-
ample, portray sales price trends that have been
rising rapidly since 1984. These data, however,
do not adjust for variations in the characteristics
of homes that are selling at a given point in time.
Thus, a trend towards the 'purchase of larger
homes, for example, will make housing prices in
There is a widespread perception that housing
prices have become "too high:' limiting the
availability of affordable housing. The notion that
housing prices are too high implies that because
the prices are unsustainable, housing prices
might fall precipitously. Like the stock market
one year ago, the housing market is now be-
lieved by some to be a "speculative bubble"
about to burst.FRBSF
mists generally expect markets to produce prices
that are sustainable. The reason is that in most
markets, participants are assumed to ha\legood
information about the "fundamentalII factors that
influence the benefits and costs of a particular
good or service and to act on this information
when they buy or sell. Th is suggests that the first
place tolook for an explanationforrecer;1t in-
creas~sin housing prices, therefore] is inchanges
in fundamental factors that influence demand
and supply.
The increases in housing prices since the mid
1970s coincide with important changes in factors
that influence the housing market First, on.the
demandside,d~mographicsand household eco-
nomics have changed dramatically in that time
period. The number of individuals between the
prime homebuying agesofJO and 34,forexam-
pie, increased from about 11. millionto over 21
million between 1970 and 1988.per capita in-
come, adjusted for inflation, has increased by 26
percent since 1970.
Second, the economic and tax policy environ-
ment has.changed in ways that Iikely increased
the attractiveness of housing assets. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, for example, expectations
of high rates of general price inflation prevailed.
It has been shown that rising inflation expecta-
tions can cause the price of long-lived, fax-
favored assets such as housing to jump signifi-
cantly. This istrueevenifexpectations of
housing price inflation are the same as those for
general prices. .
Recent changes in mortgage policy also likely
have had the effect of stimulating demand for
housing assets. In the mid"1970s, for example,
theincome of a second worker began to be in-
cluded in loan-qualification tests by lenders. This
effectively gave households greater access to
their weCllthwhenmaking housing purchases,
particularly since the laborforce participation of
women aged 25 to34 has increased 60 percent
since 1970. Similarly, in 1986, tax policy was
changed to phase out interest deductions on
consumer debt except for that secured by home
mortgages. Thus, ownership of housing became
more attractive because it provided an avenue for
acquiring tax-favored debt
These stimuli to housing demand would not have
had any effect on housing prices if supply had
b~enperfectly responsive to the increased prices
associated with increaseddel11and; In fact,
however, the growing resistanc:e ofin-place pop-
ulations to further development in areas such as
Boston, Washington, D.C., and the major Cali-
fornia cities likely has reduced the responsive-
ness of supply. It is not surprising, therefore, that
these areas have been the ones experiencing the
most rapid increases in housing prices in recent
years.
Market inefficiency?
Despite these changes in powerful, fundamental
factors, some economists believe that housing
prices nevertheless are out of Iine, at least in cer-
tain local markets. Economists Case and Shiller,
for example, surveyed homeowners in California,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin and apparently
failed to find a satisfactory "fundamental" ex-
planation for recent movements in housing
prices.
The view that housing prices are unsustainable
implies that the housing market is either unable
to use the available information on market funda-
mentals (the market is said to be "inefficient") or
is using it efficiently, but caught up in a specula-
tive process nonetheless.
The possibility that the housing market may be
inefficient has been studied recently by a num-
ber of economists. An inefficient market is one in
which it is possible for a participant to make ab-
normally high profits by using historical infor-
mation on housing prices that is available to all
participants at the time of the transaction (so-
called "weak form" inefficiency) or by using
other data available contemporaneously (so-
called "semi-strong form" inefficiency).
There are a number of reasons for thinking that
the housing market might not be completely effi-
cient An important one is that the buyers and
sellers of housing generally are involved in hous-
ing transactions infrequently and may not be
expert in the fundamental economics of the
housing market Additionally, housing assets vary
tremendously in their quality because of dif-
ferences in location, age, maintenance, and
construction. This makes it difficult to evaluate
any particular housing investment
To test for inefficiency, economists examine the
behavior of the rates of return on individual
housing units relative to that of the housing mar-
ket as a whole. An inefficient market would be
one in which deviations in this relationship can
be predicted by observable information on the
individual housing assets. Such a finding wouldsignal unexploited profit opportunities available
to investors having this information. Using this
technique, economist Peter Linneman investi-
gated the efficiency of the housing market. He
found that, when the high costs of conducting
housing transactions are considered, the housing
market offers no unexploited profit opportunities,
and thus appears to be functioning efficiently.
Speculative bubbles?
The housing market may indeed be functioning
efficiently, but prices still could deviate from the
levels determined by fundamental factors if a
speculative bubble process is underway. A spec-
ula.tive bubble could arise simply because of
widespread irrationality'--that is, participants
recognize, but inexplicably ignore, fundamental
factors. Economists are more comfortable, how-
ever, with the notion of "rational speculative
bubbles:" episodes during which market partici-
pants correctly perceive that an asset is
overpriced based on its fundamentals, but re-
main in the market because they receive efficient
compensation for doing so. In other words, the
rate of return on housing assets compensates
them for the risk of the bubble "bursting:'
The notion of rational speculative bubbles is not
universally accepted in economics because
many of its logical elements are poorly de-
veloped. For example, economists have poor
explanations why such a bubble process might
begin and end. Nevertheless, they have offered a
number of tests which, while not definitive,
might suggest whether a speculative bubble pro-
cess is underway.
One simple test is to look for abrupt changes in
the volatility of prices. The logic is that bursting
bubbles should create rare episodes of brief price
volatility. Housing price data are not particularly
amenable to this test, since price index series are
short and measured infrequently, possibly obscur-
ing periods of volatility. The available housing
data show no evidence of prices displaying this
statistical behavior.
Another test involves examining the time trend of
prices for evidence of long "runs" of excess re-
turns. Certain patterns of such returns may
suggest the existence of the rational compensa-
tion that is necessary to the formation of a
bubble. Here, the data superficially are consis-
tent with the speculative bubble hypothesis;
housing prices do move up in a heavily-trended
fashion, generating the appearance of persistent
excess returns. Whether it in fact signals a spec-
ulative bubble, or just the influence of a slowly-
evolving fundamental process, is open to debate,
however.
Recent work at this Bank has explored a third test
for speculative bubbles in housing. The test in-
volves examining the relationship between
movements in housing prices and the rental price
of housing. If housing prices are consistently re-
lated to a fundamental market such as the rental
price of similar housing, it is less likely that
prices are moving independently of market fun-
damentals as implied by the speculative bubble
hypothesis. The results of this test of "cointegra-
tion" of housing prices and rents, however, do
not support the speculative bubble hypothesis.
Fundamental factors remain important
It is frustrating for many households to see hous-
ing price increases propel the dream of home-
ownership out of reach. Therefore, attributing the
path of housing prices to a "speculative bubble"
process is,tempting, because such a process of-
fers the prospect of an abrupt decline in home
prices and a return to housing affordability. But
the data offer lukewarm support to this notion.
Moreover, housing assets do not make ideal
speculative vehicles, since they are reasonably il-
liquid, thus making it difficult to liquidate a
speculative position should investors begin to re-
assess the probability of the bubble bursting.
It seems more likely that increased demand
caused by significant changes in demography,
mortgage policy, tax policy, and the economic
environment, coupled with a reduced respon-
siveness of housing supply in recent years, are
responsible for recent increases in housing
prices. This suggests that housing prices are not
likely to decline without a significant reversal of
these trends and policies. In addition, it suggests
that policies to make housing more affordable (by
subsidizing mortgages, for example) will not be
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